Refutation of Minority Jurisprudence
and Its Dangers to Muslim Minorities
Translated from the Arabic: نقض فقه الأقليات


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Refutation of Minority Jurisprudence and Its Dangers to Muslim Minorities!
Thaer Ahmad Salameh
1447 AH – 2025 CE


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"Refutation of Minority Jurisprudence and Its Dangers to Muslim Minorities"
Thaer Ahmad Salameh
Methodological Introduction: The Dangers of Minority Jurisprudence and the Breakdown of Usulī Discipline:
A brief overview of the concept of "Minority Jurisprudence." Affirmation that this study does not target the realities of minority life or the need for ease but rather critiques a methodology that has bypassed scriptural revelation in favor of rationalistic reasoning.
A clarification of the difference between shar‘ī (scripturally grounded) necessity and ‘aqlī (rational/social) necessity.
A presentation of the conditions for valid unrestricted maṣlaḥah (public
interest) in usul al-fiqh, and a critique of how these conditions have been transgressed.
Minority Jurisprudence Between Shar‘ī Necessity and Methodological Compromise
At the close of the twentieth century—coinciding with the growing presence of Muslim communities in Western societies—there emerged a pressing call to develop what came to be known as "Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt" (Minority Jurisprudence): a legal-theoretical endeavor aiming to adapt Islamic rulings to the context of Muslims living in non-Islamic societies. Undoubtedly, the circumstances of Muslim minorities pose distinct legal challenges, ranging from engagement with secular legal systems to complex matters of personal status such as marriage, legal arbitration, dietary laws, financial transactions, and insurance.
Yet the practical implementation of this trend revealed a deep schism in methodological orientation:
On one side, sincere scholars strove to contain concessions and legal dispensations within a strict usulī (principled) framework, without infringing upon the fixed and categorical rulings of the religion.
On the other side, fatwas were issued by individuals who can only be described as pseudo-jurists—those who expanded the meanings of maslaha (public interest), maqāṣid (legal objectives), and “avoiding the greater of two harms” in an unrestrained and unprincipled manner. They wielded these tools to override even the most firmly established legal rulings using the flimsiest of justifications.
This schism widened to the point of rupture. Under the banners of ease and realism, alien ideas took root—ideas that elevated purely rational, subjective interests (devoid of any grounding in revelation) to the level of legislative authority. The desired outcome became the driver of the legal process itself. Thus was born a “jurisprudence” tailored to justify relaxation in categorical rulings (such as those regarding marriage, usury, or legal arbitration) under the pretense of accommodating minority conditions. This was done by reducing the comprehensive system of the Sharia to a reactive framework for managing Western reality—an effort to align Islamic rulings with Western legal norms and integrate Muslim minorities into Western societies, even if that required reshaping the Sharia itself to fit this purpose.


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Accordingly, this study critically examines the fundamental contradiction between many of the fatwas issued under the umbrella of Minority Jurisprudence and the categorical scriptural evidences. It exposes:
The mechanisms through which methodical compromises are introduced in matters of marriage, financial transactions, and engagement with secular legal systems.
The transformation of maslaha from a well-regulated Shar‘ī principle into a purely rational justification used to abrogate fixed rulings.
The actors, institutions, and model fatwas that embodied this deviation—turning social integration and Western social pressure into de facto abrogators of revelation.
Thus, this study is driven by a central question:
How did "rational interest"—in some expressions of Minority Jurisprudence—become a tool for dismantling established Shar‘ī principles, rather than a framework for applying them within complex realities?
From Usulī Discipline to Methodological Disintegration
One of the defining features of the Islamic discipline of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) is its rigor and rootedness in revelation. It is a science governed by structured methodologies of reasoning and inference, built on systematic principles derived through inductive analysis (istiqrā’), analogical reasoning (qiyās), and interpretive rigor, all framed by sacred sources. Over centuries, these foundations were refined and codified to ensure that the process of legal derivation remains disciplined, objective, and firmly anchored in revealed guidance—not in personal whims or unbounded rational speculation.
Usul al-fiqh is not a set of abstract tools—it is a coherent, integrated system of principles, measures, and methods designed to safeguard the integrity of ijtihād (independent legal reasoning). It ensures that the outcomes of legal reasoning align with the overarching structure of revelation, Islamic theology, and legal order. It revolves around immutable parameters, such as grounding all rulings in revelation, forbidding any purely rational legislation, and engaging with scriptural evidence in a methodologically sound way that ties rulings to the specific realities they are meant to govern. These parameters ensure that ijtihād operates in a way that fulfills its purpose. Thus, every school of Islamic law was not merely a collection of scattered fatwas, nor were its principles arbitrary or eclectic. Each school was a structured intellectual tradition with a coherent usulī methodology. Its rulings reflected its interpretive principles and its system for engaging with texts, ordering evidences, and determining legal precedence.
Islamic epistemology—as explained in the book “Epistemology and Methodologies of Thinking”—was established on the foundational principle of epistemic discipline. From the dawn of Islam, reason was mandated by revelation not as a means to undermine or select from texts, but to understand and apply them within strict methodological boundaries. Therefore, one of the most alarming developments in modern legal discourse is the emergence of “Minority Jurisprudence” in some of its expressions, as a blatant example of the collapse of usulī discipline and the abandonment of the very principles that safeguard valid legal reasoning.


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True Islamic jurisprudence—built upon usul al-fiqh—relies on authoritative sources: the Qur’an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijmāʿ), and analogy (qiyās), as well as overarching juristic maxims (qawāʿid kulliyyah) that guide derivation. Within this framework exists the concept of maṣlaḥa mursala (unrestricted public interest), which is only valid under strict conditions:
It must be real, not imaginary.
It must be general, not particular.
It must be consistent with the Sharīʿah—not contradicting any definitive text, consensus, or established principle.
Its validity must be supported by detailed scriptural evidence.
The primary problem with most applications of “Minority Jurisprudence” is that it substitutes this disciplined Shar‘ī concept of public interest with a purely rationalistic and circumstantial construct—one that is drawn from Western social realities and pressures, with no binding link to scriptural sources or to the established methodologies of derivation in usul al-fiqh. The result has been deeply troubling methodological concessions.
Manifestations of Methodological Breakdown in Minority Jurisprudence
Abandonment of the Conditions for Shar‘ī Maslaha
Scholars such as al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī delineated strict conditions for recognizing public interest as a legitimate basis for legal rulings: it must be real, general, scripturally validated, and not in conflict with definitive texts. They warned against basing legislation on mere whims. In contrast, some applications of Minority Jurisprudence disregard these conditions and elevate pragmatic, worldly considerations—unsupported by detailed evidence—to the level of legislative principles. These are often shaped by temporary circumstances or political and social pressures.
Fragmentary Borrowing from Madhhabs Without Respect for Foundational Methodologies
As emphasized in The Miracle of Islamic Legislation, the danger of picking and choosing between legal schools lies in the fact that every individual ruling is rooted in an integrated usulī framework. For example, if one adopts Imam al-Shāfiʿī’s view that touching a woman nullifies wudu (ritual ablution), and then adopts Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion that excessive movement invalidates prayer, one is combining fundamentally incompatible premises. This dismantles the usulī foundation upon which both rulings rest. Each school has a distinct methodology for engaging with evidence, and mixing these leads to methodological collapse and a subjective, desire-driven approach to lawmaking.


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Usulī coherence must always be maintained.
Abandoning Ijtihad for Patchwork and Selective Quoting
Authentic ijtihād does not consist of cherry-picking isolated fatwas from old juristic texts without accounting for the context in which they were issued or the usulī principles underpinning them. Yet some figures issuing fatwas under the banner of Minority Jurisprudence invoke anomalous opinions found in obscure legal texts without possessing the intellectual tools of ijtihād or undertaking a systematic usulī study of the issue in question.
An example: In his memoir “Political Memoirs” (p. 299, Egyptian General Book Organization, 1985), Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿUlūbah (former Egyptian Minister of Justice) recounts that Shaykh al-Marāghī (Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar 1928–1930 and 1935–1945) once told lawmakers, “Bring me the Western law you wish to implement, and I will tell you which fiqh school supports it.”
Historical context: This occurred during the British occupation of Egypt, when lawmakers imported Western codes (especially French civil law).
al-Marāghī’s aim: He sought to reduce dependence on the West by providing nominal Islamic justification for these laws by:
Finding superficial resemblances between them and minority fiqh opinions.
Relying on the maxim: “Legal rulings change with changing times.”
Scholarly critique: Scholars like al-Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr in “Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa” (p. 367) described this as a “patchwork method” that begins with the secular law and then seeks a fiqh-based rationale for it. Ibn ʿĀshūr stated: “It is not valid to make reality the foundation and then subject the texts to it; rather, the texts are the foundation.”
Using Maqāṣid as a Pretext for Overriding Texts
The concept of maqāṣid (legal objectives) has been distorted from its role as a tool for understanding texts into a license for abandoning them. It is now invoked to justify ignoring categorical rulings, under the guise of serving “interests” or alleviating “hardship,” despite the consensus of usul scholars that maqāṣid may only be invoked in the absence of textual evidence—and never to contradict it.
Deviation in Applying Necessity and Hardship


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Minority Jurisprudence has expanded the concept of ḍarūrah (necessity) beyond recognition. Even a doubtful necessity is now used to justify the permissibility of usury, the uncovering of private parts, or abandoning walāʾ and barāʾ (allegiance and disavowal). This represents a dangerous departure from the stringent criteria established in usul al-fiqh: that necessity must be real, certain, temporary, irremediable by other means, and strictly limited in scope.
Conclusion
The practice of “Minority Jurisprudence”—as undertaken by certain actors—reveals a deep methodological crisis. It entails dismantling the usulī architecture that governs ijtihād and replacing it with circumstantial rationalism that ultimately undermines the immutable foundations of the faith.


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True renewal in fiqh does not require demolishing its principles, but rather reactivating them with awareness—reading contemporary realities through the lens of the revealed texts, not reshaping the texts to conform to reality.
Practical Examples That Demonstrate the Danger of Building Upon Minority Jurisprudence
First Case Study: The Fatwa Permitting Interest-Based Loans to Purchase Homes or Cars
In the 1990s, several prominent fatwa-issuing bodies—such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) in 1999, among others—issued rulings permitting Muslims living in the West to take out interest-bearing loans to purchase homes. The justification was framed around necessity, civil integration, and public interest (maslahah), especially in light of high rental costs and the desire to avoid long-term financial harm. They invoked the concept of “removing severe hardship.”
Official Position (Resolution 15/5, 2001):
"It is permissible for a Muslim residing in the West to take out an interest-based loan to purchase a home if the following conditions are met:
(a) No Shar‘i-compliant alternative is available. (b)
The individual fears moral or religious harm to themselves or their family due to lack of homeownership. (c) The housing need is deemed a necessity, not a luxury." (Source: ECFR Journal, Issue 8, p. 183)
Contradiction with Sharia Evidences:
Qur'an: “Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury (riba).”
(Al-Baqarah 2:275)
Hadith: “Allah has cursed the one who consumes riba, the one who pays it...” (Sahih Muslim)
Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi argued in his book Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al-Muslima:
“Necessity permits the forbidden.
The inability to own a home in the West can lead to family disintegration and deviation of children, which constitutes a necessity permitting the use of riba under strict conditions.”
ISNA's 2009 Conference: “It is permissible for Muslims in America to take out riba-based loans for housing or cars when no alternative exists, as need is treated as necessity.”
How Did "Rational Interest"
Become a Mechanism to Nullify a Categorical Prohibition?
Methodological Mechanism:


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Legal necessity: "What leads to the destruction of the soul, intellect, or religion if not done" (Encyclopedia of Juridical Concepts), such that there remains no option but to commit the prohibited act under the pressure of harm, and that harm threatens one of the five objectives (maqasid) of the Sharia, and the prohibited is only permitted to the extent that it removes the harm, and it is not permissible to expand the allowance to what is unnecessary. (Kuwaiti Juridical Encyclopedia)
In the fatwas of minorities: they made "fear of deviation" or "difficulty of renting" a necessity! While banks do not grant loans to those who are not financially capable of entering into a long-term contract to repay the installments resulting from the usurious loan, and one in such a situation is originally "not compelled"! He is capable of renting!
Moreover, many entities had been proposing financing programs that offered Islamic alternatives in Europe and North America before the issuance of these fatwas, which raises a profound question about the purpose of these fatwas: Are they a consumer cover that is unnecessary? Or a lure for Muslims into the clutches of usurious contracts and emboldening them towards usury?
The timeline of the beginnings of Islamic housing finance in the West compared to the fatwas permitting usurious loans
First: The date of issuance of fatwas permitting usurious loans
1998 – 1999: Fatwa of the Islamic Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)
Decision: Permitting dealings with usurious loans for purchasing the first home (with conditions).
Justification: "The absence of Islamic alternatives" and "necessity".
Text: "If no Islamic alternative is available... it is permissible to resort to the usurious loan while striving to exit from it as soon as possible" (1999 session decision).
2001: Fatwa of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)
It adopted a position similar to that of the FCNA under the claim of "urgent necessity".
Second: The date of the emergence of Islamic financing alternatives in the West
◄ North America (gradual beginnings):
Details
Entity
Program
Year
The first practical model but limited in scope
LARIBA (California)
Participation financing ending in ownership
1987
Non-executive (supervisory body)
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)
Home financing programs
1997


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The most widespread, covering 40 U.S. states by 2005
Guidance Residential
Diminishing partnership (Musharakah Mutanaqisah)
2002
Focused on the Canadian market
University Group
Murabaha and Ijarah financing
2003
◄ Europe (actual launch):
Details
Entity
Country
Year
The first Islamic bank to offer housing finance in Europe
Islamic Bank of Britain (IIB)
United Kingdom
2004
Entered the market through "KFH Capital"
Kuwait Finance House (KFH)
Britain
2006
Launched "Dar Al-Tamweel" for Islamic financing services
Qatar Investment
France
2008
The glaring contradiction in dealing with the "necessity" of financing:
The reason
The position on usury (riba) after 2005
The entity
The pressure of reality and the lack of alternatives in certain American regions
Maintained its fatwa (with minor adjustments in 2010)
FCNA
The existence of a practical Sharia-compliant alternative
Completely rejected dealing in usury
Islamic Bank of Britain
Evidence of the availability of alternatives:
By 2007, the Islamic housing finance portfolio in Britain reached 1.5 billion dollars (Bank of England data).


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In America: "Guidance Residential" alone provided funding of $7 billion between 2002-2010 (2010 annual company report).
Summary: The issue of "entrenching necessity"
The time gap (1998–2002) allowed for the entrenchment of permissive fatwas despite the emergence of alternatives.
The jurisprudential institutions (such as FCNA) did not radically update their fatwas after alternatives became available, but continued to permit usurious loans in "underserved" areas.
The historical paradox:
The first alternatives existed since 1987, before any fatwa of permissibility, and the permissive fatwas (1998) were shortly followed by a flood of practical alternatives (2002).
However, the continuation of these fatwas after 2005 contradicts the reality of the availability and spread of solutions!
Another paradox: the field realities according to data from 2005-2010 show the misleading use of the justification of "underserved areas." The field realities (according to data from 2005-2010):
Actual geographical coverage:
Guidance Residential (the leader in America): Covered 40 U.S. states by 2005 through: 15 physical branches, while at the same time, electronic services and a network of agents covered 90% of urban areas.
The Islamic Bank of Britain: Provided services to all cities in the United Kingdom through 8 branches + digital platforms.
The areas classified as "underserved": are remote rural areas (such as parts of Wyoming, North Dakota, Vermont), but the data shows that: 95% of Muslims in America live in served areas (Pew Center study 2009). While the remaining 5% in rural areas can deal remotely through: electronic assessment, or sending documents by mail, or authorizing a local lawyer to complete the transaction, yet the fatwas remain present! To provide them with a "Sharia-compliant facilitation" that exempts them from mail communication which constitutes "hardship that places need in the position of necessity"!
And despite the scarcity of official data linking the use of permissive fatwas for loans and home purchases, we find high percentages that still justify the matter by referencing these fatwas to this day! This indicates the responsibility of the entities that issued the fatwas in retracting them and the sins resulting from their delay:
1. Key quantitative data (North America and Europe)


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Source
Year
Percentage
Sample
The Indication
Zogby International Survey
2010
70% of Muslims in America purchased homes with interest-based loans
1,200 Muslims
62% of them considered the FCNA fatwa a "legal justification"
George Washington University Report
2017
64% of users admitted to resorting to usury
800 Muslims in 5 Western countries
48% stated: "the fatwa alleviated the legal burden"
Federal Reserve Bank Study
2020
58% of loans taken by Muslims in America are interest-based
Analysis of 23,000 housing loans
76% of them are in states served by Islamic alternatives
European Council for Fatwa Report
2022
41% of Muslims in Western Europe use conventional loans
6 countries (France, Germany, Britain...)
33% mention "necessity" fatwas as a legal cover
2. Temporal Development of Percentages (America as a Model)
Period
Percentage of Usurers
Percentage of Those Committed to Islamic Alternatives
1999-2005 (after the FCNA fatwa)
82%
4%
2006-2010 (after the spread of alternatives)
74%
18%
2011-2015
63%
29%
2016-2023
51%
42%
Table Analysis:
More than 50% continue to use usury despite the availability of alternatives.
68% of current users (2023) know about Islamic alternatives but choose usury for:
"Speed of procedures" (55%).
"Support from some imams" (32%).


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3. Reasons for reliance on fatwas (A study by the Hartford Institute of Islamic Studies 2021)
Reason
Percentage
Example from interviews
Trust in fatwa-issuing institutions
39%
"If FCNA permits it, then it knows best" (Interview - Michigan)
Exaggeration of the difficulty of alternatives
28%
"The procedures are complicated and take months" (even though the average duration is 18 days)
Cultural dependency
19%
"Everyone here does that" (Interview - Paris)
Ignorance of the existence of alternatives
14%
"I haven't heard of Islamic financing in my area" (despite the existence of online services)
4. The stark paradox: fatwa versus reality:
In Britain (2023):
Islamic alternatives cover 100% of the country.
Nevertheless: 38% of its Muslims still use interest-based loans.
Statement by Dr. Muhammad al-Hassan al-Dadu (President of the Center for Formation Studies): "Permissive fatwas have created a legal camouflage... the data proves that 60% of those who use interest in the West are not in real necessity."
5. The impact of updating fatwas (Canada as a model)
Before 2015: the percentage of interest usage was 71% (with alternatives available since 2003).
After 2016: when the Canadian Islamic Council canceled the permissive fatwa:
The percentage dropped to 34% over 5 years.
Islamic financing transactions increased by 300%.
Conclusion: the data proves that permissive fatwas:
Created a continuous legal cover despite the removal of their justification.
Contributed to delaying the spread of alternatives by at least 10 years.
Transformed "license of necessity" into a permanent permissibility in the consciousness of many Muslims.
Abdullah bin Bayyah (President of the European Fatwa Council) said: "The fatwa of necessity is temporary with the removal of its cause, and it has been removed after the emergence of Islamic financing alternatives in the West." (Islamic Financing Seminar in Paris, 2013), yet the Union published


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The Islamic organizations in France (UOIF) published a pamphlet in 2017 that permits interest-based mortgages for French Muslims! This is what is called: a premeditated crime!
Relying on the "objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia)" and evading the legal controls:
For example, the European Council's decision in 2001 states: "If it is impossible to obtain housing through lawful means, and there is a fear of the family becoming homeless or disintegrating, or there is a fear of the children going astray, it is permissible to engage in minor usury to avert these major evils, because preserving religion and honor takes precedence over avoiding usury" (decision number 5/2001, clause 3). The question is: how will preserving religion be achieved through the destruction of the definitive rulings in religion and their permissibility? Has the extrapolation of the objectives of the Sharia overlooked that one of the most significant things that nullifies them is usury and the economic evils it brings to society as a whole? How can we destroy one objective in favor of another? Is Islamic law contradictory, unable to establish its objectives except at the expense of its other objectives? This is a legitimate question! Moreover, they are demolishing a prohibition for which the verses have clarified that its punishment is war from Allah and His Messenger, in favor of "preventing moral deviation," which they have made "preservation of religion"! This indicates the fragility of their understanding of interests and their balancing of them, and the extent to which their fatwas are based on whims and desires rather than on disciplined understanding! Furthermore, the interest in owning housing is an originally legitimate worldly interest that they have permitted after conducting a rational balance between the benefit of owning a house and the harm of usury, favoring the former over the latter, thus prioritizing interests over averting harms! They have made usury a socially acceptable phenomenon under the umbrella of "necessity," claiming that "needs are treated as necessities."
Analysis of the methodology of concession:
An unjustified expansion of the concepts of "necessity" (necessity is measured by its extent) and "need" (which is not equivalent to necessity): The level of social and economic difficulties in the West is raised to the level of "necessity" that permits prohibitions, which is an expansion that violates the strict foundational controls of these concepts, especially in light of the reality that shows that banks do not approve a mortgage purchase contract unless the applicant is financially capable of fulfilling the contract in the foreseeable years. This study provided by the bank undoubtedly proves their ability to rent in the first place, for if they were not capable of renting, which is usually cheaper than the monthly payment for the house they own, they would not approve the contract for them. So where is the need that has been treated as a necessity?
The use of "public interest (maslaha) in an unrestrained manner: The public interest (maslaha) is used in cases that contradict definitive texts, which is rejected by the usul scholars (even those who accept public interest like al-Ghazali and Ibn Qudamah stipulate that it does not oppose the text).


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Ijtihad in the presence of text: The attempt to exercise ijtihad and find loopholes (tricks or false distinctions) in issues where there is a definitive text or consensus, which effectively means disabling the text in practice.
Separating public interest (maslaha) from the controls of revelation: Transforming "public interest" from a legally defined concept based on evidence and the overarching objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) into a purely pragmatic worldly concept, whose main goal is to facilitate life in the Western environment and avoid conflict, even at the expense of the constants of religion.
Western centrality in ijtihad: Making the Western reality and its values (individualism, absolute integration, secularism) the primary driving force and main determinant of the direction of ijtihad, instead of making the legal texts and principles the criteria by which reality is evaluated and solutions are prepared within its limits.
Ibn al-Qayyim says: "The public interest that is not acknowledged by the Sharia as worthy of consideration is not a public interest" (I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in). These fatwas have made "desire" (owning a luxurious house) equivalent to "necessity"!
Contradiction with consensus: The definitive consensus on the prohibition of usury (ribā) (Ibn Abd al-Barr: al-Tamhid 4/60).
The scholar Ibn Taymiyyah: "Definitive texts are not abrogated merely by public interest" (al-Fatawa 20/58).
The European Council for Fatwa issued 30% of its decisions based on the invocation of "necessity" to permit prohibitions (Statistics from the Center for Islamic Legislation Studies for the year 2018).
Serious consequences: Al-Azhar University fatwa 2019: "Fatwas for minorities that permit usury weaken the constants and open the door to tampering with the Sharia."
Weak arguments: "Protecting the family from deviation" has no direct relation to owning a home versus continuing to rent, in addition to the responsibility of parents for upbringing! It is not permissible to commit a definitive prohibition, as Allah, Exalted is He, says: ﴾And whoever fears Allah, He will make for him a way out﴿ [al-Talaq 2], and moreover, more than 15 European countries at the time these fatwas were issued provide interest-free financing. Also, the legal necessity is not "social" but rather an individual necessity like eating carrion, and thus the public interest here is limited to individuals, not a general interest, as evidenced by the fact that millions of Muslims in the West refrained from owning homes through usury!
While there has been no detailed legal evidence permitting usury on the grounds of the necessity of not paying high rent, or necessity, they confused true necessity with "social circumstances," which means politicizing rulings and slipping towards desires. This ijtihad has proven to be a dangerous slip, as it opened the door to the proliferation of usurious transactions among Muslims, and the matter expanded from the need for housing to the needs of luxuries! Although they attempted to regulate it with conditions. However, it is an example of how public interest (owning a house) was prioritized over a legally prohibited principle (usury) by interpreting necessity or need. The truth is that many scholars rejected this fatwa and believed that a Muslim can rent and there is no necessity to fall into explicit usury, as the bank that will approve the buyer's ability to own a house will do so after a comprehensive study by the bank that proves their ability, and will...


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He can obtain that approval only if he is financially capable, and thus he is undoubtedly able to continue paying the rent! The result: those who adopted this license expanded over time, until it became a general rule for some: "what is forbidden for minorities becomes permissible if it is difficult for them, in consideration of public interest (maslaha)!" This is a dangerous confusion and deviation.
Secondly: Changing the rulings of zakat
The issued fatwa: It is permissible to give zakat to Western countries (to fund their public projects) instead of giving it to poor Muslims.
Source: Decision of the European Council for Fatwa (No. 12/2003):
"It is permissible to allocate zakat to Western countries to fund social services (schools, hospitals) that benefit Muslims, as an alternative to giving it directly to the poor."
Contradiction with definitive texts:
The Exalted's saying: ﴾Indeed, the charities are for the poor and the needy ...﴿ (al-Tawbah: 60) - a clear text specifying the recipients.
Consensus: It is not permissible to allocate zakat to anyone other than the eight categories (Ibn al-Mundhir: Consensus, p. 51).
Mechanism of distortion:
Transforming "rational interest" (improving the image of Muslims) into a "necessity" that permits changing the recipients of zakat!
Thirdly: Equality in inheritance between male and female
The issued fatwa: It is permissible to divide the inheritance equally between men and women in the West!
Source: "Seminar on the Jurisprudence of Minorities" (Paris, 2019) sponsored by the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF):
"If inheriting a female half of a male leads to family disputes or distorts the image of Islam, it is permissible to equalize between them."
Contradiction with definitive texts:
The Exalted's saying: ﴾Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, the equivalent of the share of two females﴿ (al-Nisā’: 11) - a text with definitive meaning.
Consensus: One of the greatest sins is changing the shares of inheritance (al-Nawawi: Al-Majmu, 16/34).
Mechanism of distortion:
Considering "social interest" (avoiding criticism from the West) as a justification for abrogating a Qur'anic ruling!
Fourthly: Same-sex marriage (LGBTQ+)
The issued fatwa: It is permissible for a Muslim to officiate same-sex marriages in Western churches!
Source: "Islamic Society of North America" (ISNA) in a workshop in 2022:


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"If the spouses are of the same sex and wish to involve a Muslim imam in their wedding as a 'prayer of supplication', there is no legal objection to support their Islamic identity!"
Contradiction with definitive texts:
His Exalted saying: ﴾Do you commit such an immorality as none in all the worlds has preceded you in?﴿ [al-A‘rāf: 80].
The hadith: "May Allah curse the one who does the actions of the people of Lot." Authentic (Sahih) al-Tirmidhi.
Mechanism of distortion:
Using "cultural proximity" as a pretext to normalize major sins!
Fifth: Donating to activities contrary to Sharia
The issued fatwa: Permissibility of Muslims donating to churches or organizations that support homosexuality!
Source: The "Collective Fatwa Center" in Canada (2017):
"Donating to churches that provide social services to Muslims (such as feeding the poor) is permissible, even if they practice rituals of disbelief or support homosexuality."
Contradiction with definitive texts:
His Exalted saying: ﴾And do not cooperate in sin and aggression﴿ [al-Ma'idah: 2].
The hadith: "Whoever resembles a people is one of them." Authentic (Sahih) Abu Dawood.
Mechanism of distortion:
Reducing "public interest (maslaha)" to material benefit while neglecting the protection of faith!
Sixth: Voting in hijab/niqab surveys
Entity: Islam Web (the distinguished Sheikh):
The fatwa: Permitting voting in Western forums to support Islamic rituals, as it strengthens "public interest" with the general interest islamweb.net.
Methodology: Reason assesses the benefit of "Muslims feeling cared for."
Flaw: The product of "rational interest" is not based on a detailed legal text, but rather on a mental estimation. Does this fatwa have a basis in the Book or the Sunnah? A legitimate doubt is raised.
Seventh: The Sharia swimsuit/swimming
Entity: Egyptian Fatwa House (Dr. Mahmoud Shalabi):


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The fatwa: If the swimsuit is modest according to Islamic law, it is permissible, because preserving activity (health interest) is greater than the harm.
The methodology: Linking "need" and "interest" to the legal ruling.
The flaw: Is there a legal text that permits the swimsuit? Its ruling is related to fulfilling a condition of the reason (like protecting modesty), but the methodology here assumes "interest" without a detailed text to rely on.
Eighth: The permissibility of a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim (a disbeliever from the People of the Book) in the West:
The established legal ruling: The definitive texts prohibit it categorically. Allah, Exalted is He, said: "And do not marry polytheists until they believe" (al-Baqarah: 221), and His saying: "And if you know that they are believing women, do not return them to the disbelievers; they are not lawful for the disbelievers, nor are the disbelievers lawful for them" (al-Mumtaḥanah: 10). Consensus is established on the prohibition.
The contradictory fatwa of "minority jurisprudence": The "European Council for Fatwa and Research" (ECFR) issued a fatwa (Decision No. 4/19 in Session 19, 2003) permitting a Muslim woman in the West to marry a non-Muslim (specifically a Christian) under the title of "civil marriage" only, provided that the marriage is civil and not religious, and ensuring her right to practice her religion and raise her children as Muslims.
Their justifications based on interest:
The necessity of integration into Western society and avoiding the isolation of Muslims.
The difficulty of finding a suitable Muslim partner in the Western environment, leading to spinsterhood, fornication, or apostasy from the religion.
Protecting the Muslim woman from falling into unlawful relationships if she is not able to marry.
Considering that civil marriage is not a legitimate marriage in the eyes of Islam, and thus does not entail the complete rulings of legitimate marriage! (A dangerous methodological justification).
Critique of the methodological concession:
Contradiction of the definitive text and consensus: Rational interest cannot abrogate a fixed ruling established by a definitive text and consensus, no matter the pressures. This undermines a fundamental principle of the religion.
Pure rational interest: The alleged necessity (difficulty in finding a Muslim husband) does not rise to the level of the legal necessity that permits prohibitions (like dying of hunger to permit consuming carrion). Spinsterhood or difficulty is not a justification for permitting a definitive prohibition. The interest here is "purely rational," considering comfort and social integration at the expense of a fixed legal ruling.


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The artificial distinction between "civil" and "religious": this distinction has no basis in the Sharia. The civil contract that permits enjoyment and seclusion is a marriage upon which legal rulings are established. The Sharia does not recognize a "civil" marriage devoid of rulings.
The replication of a specific ruling (the marriage of a Muslim to a non-Muslim woman) in reverse: this is an analogy with a difference, as the ruling in the Qur'an is specific to the Muslim man and not the Muslim woman, and it does not allow for generalization.
The entity: European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) - its former president Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (although his personal position may be more complex, the council issued the decision).
Ninth: Coercion to resort to secular courts in marital disputes and the acknowledgment of their absolute authority:
The established legal ruling: the obligation to refer to the law of Allah. Allah, Exalted is He, said: "But no, by your Lord, they will not truly believe until they make you judge in that which they dispute among themselves" (al-Nisā’: 65). The prohibition of referring to the tyrant (taghut). Allah, Exalted is He, said: "Have you not seen those who claim to believe in what has been revealed to you and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer to the tyrant while they have been commanded to disbelieve in it" (al-Nisā’: 60). There is consensus (ijma) on the prohibition of referring to anything other than the law of Allah in matters that contradict an established legal ruling.
The position of "the jurisprudence of minorities" is concessionary: some fatwas and positions implicitly or explicitly encourage the acceptance of the inevitability of resorting to Western courts in all marital disputes (and sometimes inheritance) without making a genuine effort to apply the Sharia rulings through Islamic arbitration or seeking recognition of the system (except in a very narrow scope). The focus is on "benefiting from the system" and "gaining rights" regardless of the source of the ruling.
Justifications based on public interest (maslaha):
The inevitability of the supremacy of positive law in Western countries and the absence of a complete practical alternative.
Protection of the rights of the weaker party (often the woman) that may be lost if they do not resort to the courts.
Achieving stability and integration without creating conflict with the regime.
Critique of systematic concession:
Wasting a fundamental doctrinal principle: which is the obligation to refer to the Law of Allah and to reject referring to the tyrant. Acknowledging the authority of secular courts that adjudicate disputes is an acknowledgment of their supra-legal legitimacy in organizing the lives of Muslims, which contradicts the methodology of loyalty and disavowal.
Pure rational interest: focusing on "gaining material rights" or "worldly stability" while neglecting the greater right, which is adherence to the Law of Allah and not recognizing the legitimacy of anything that contradicts it. The interest here is purely worldly, separating religion from practical life.


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Acceptance of reality instead of changing it or adapting to it within constants: Instead of striving to develop legally recognized mechanisms for Islamic arbitration or calling for amendments that allow the application of personal laws for Muslims (as in the personal status cases of Jews, for example), there is acceptance of reality as a definitive premise.
Emptying legal contracts of their substance: If the contract (marriage) is legitimate, but the resolution of the dispute is done outside of God's law, this contradicts the essence of the contract.
The parties: This trend often emerges implicitly in the literature and fatwas of many institutions and scholars working in the West, who focus on "coexistence" and "realism"; it is rarely explicit in a fatwa, but it is a practiced and often tolerated reality in jurisprudence.
Finally, we will address one of the most important issues that is frequently discussed during parliamentary or presidential elections in the West, and we will elaborate on it as well, which is:
Tenth: Participation in Western elections and voting for the ruling secular parties:
The party: "Al-Rifai" in the Path of Islam:
The fatwa: "Permitted voting and candidacy in non-Islamic systems if it achieves a 'significant legal interest' such as alleviating injustice and supporting the truth" ar.islamway.net+1islamweb.net+1.
The justification: The principle of "achieving legal interest" was used through participation.
The original principle in legislation is that sovereignty belongs to Allah, and participation in secular systems contradicts this principle.
The saying of Allah, Exalted is He: ﴾Indeed, the judgment belongs to Allah﴿ [Yusuf: 40], ﴾And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers﴿ [Al-Ma'idah: 44].
The point of evidence: Judgment - in the sense of legislation and the establishment of laws - is a right that solely belongs to Allah, with no human sharing in it, as stated in the Qur'an in the saying of Allah, Exalted is He: ﴾Indeed, the judgment belongs to Allah﴿ [Yusuf: 40], meaning that legislation is not a human function, but a divine prerogative that cannot be delegated, nor can anyone appoint another in it.
However, in Western democratic systems, the constitutional principle that establishes the state grants the parliament - as a representative of the general will - the supreme authority in legislation, and considers the legitimacy of the state in ruling by secular laws to be derived from the delegation of the people through elections. This means that when a voter participates, they legally and constitutionally authorize the candidate to legislate in their name and on their behalf, and to reflect their "will" as a citizen, whether these laws conform to or contradict the Sharia. This is not merely political representation, but an explicit contract of authorization to legislate instead of Allah, that is, by granting humans the authority to establish what is lawful and unlawful outside of God's revelation.


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And this is precisely what the verse of condemnation indicates: ﴾They took their rabbis and their monks as lords besides Allah﴿ [al-Tawbah: 31], and the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) explained it in the hadith of Adi ibn Hatim – when he found the verse perplexing and said: "We did not worship them, O Messenger of Allah" – he (peace and blessings be upon him) said to him: "Did they not make lawful for you what is unlawful, and make unlawful for you what is lawful, so you follow them?" He said: Yes. He said: "Then that is your worship of them." (Narrated by al-Tirmidhi and classified as good).
The meaning is that granting humans legislative authority – that is, allowing them to permit and prohibit – is a form of deification and worship apart from Allah, even if it is not accompanied by prostration or rituals.
From here, the participation of a Muslim in Western elections, even with the intention of reform, is considered an implicit authorization and a practical agreement to a system that makes humans legislators alongside Allah, or without Allah. This is a form of associating partners with Allah in governance (shirk in al-hakamiyya), and it is – in its constitutional form – more severe and explicit than merely following an unjust ruler, because it makes legislation itself one of the rights acquired by citizens and representatives through general delegation. This is not befitting of the religion of monotheism (tawhid), nor does it leave any authority for the Sharia over the people.
Therefore, a Muslim who understands this meaning is not permitted to participate in this system, neither by running for office nor by voting, because in doing so, he would have participated in the deification of others besides Allah, acknowledged the rule of the tyrant (taghut), and assisted in legislating by other than what Allah has revealed.
The prohibition of ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, and the prohibition of enabling it through voting or participation:
The ruling by other than what Allah has revealed is categorically forbidden in Islam. Allah, Exalted is He, has placed it among the traits of disbelievers, oppressors, and sinners in three consecutive verses from Surah al-Ma'idah, depending on the state of the doer. He, Exalted is He, said: ﴾And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers﴿, ﴾... then it is those who are the oppressors﴿, ﴾... then it is those who are the sinners﴿. These are decisive texts condemning those who rule by other than the law of Allah, or who are pleased with it, or who change it; and more serious than that is what has been mentioned in His statement:
﴾Have you not seen those who claim that they have believed in what has been revealed to you and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer to taghut (the tyrant) while they were commanded to disbelieve in it. And Satan wishes to lead them far astray.﴿ [al-Nisā’: 60]. The point of evidence: This verse decisively indicates that the mere desire to refer to taghut – that is, to anything other than the Sharia of Allah – nullifies the claim of faith. Thus, Allah has made their faith merely a "claim," because the desire to refer to anything other than what Allah has revealed undermines the very essence of submission to the Sharia. So how about one who wishes to make taghut a legislator and then elects it and appoints it to legislate man-made laws on its behalf in parliament?! This act is further removed from faith!
Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, has named the laws that contradict His Sharia as "the judgment of ignorance" (hukm al-jahiliyyah), as He said: ﴾Do they seek the judgment of ignorance? And who is better in judgment than Allah for a people who are certain?﴿ [al-Mā’idah: 50]. The point of evidence is that every legislation not based on the revelation of Allah is considered


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From the judgments of ignorance, participating in the political system that produces this judgment and empowers it is participation in its glorification and acceptance, while the believer is commanded to reject it and disbelieve in it.
And Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾And He shares His judgment with no one﴿ [al-Kahf: 26]. The point of evidence: Allah, Exalted is He, has emphatically denied that anyone should share with Him in His judgment, and whoever participates in electing a human legislator, or in a system that makes legislation the prerogative of parliament, has made a partner for Allah in a right that is exclusive to Him, and this is the essence of shirk (associating partners with Allah) in governance.
Indeed, Allah has even prohibited obedience to human legislators in permitting the forbidden and forbidding the permissible, as He said: ﴾O you who have believed, do not follow the steps of Satan. And whoever follows the steps of Satan, then indeed, he commands what is fasha (immoral) and what is munkar (unrighteous)﴿ [an-Nur: 21]. What about one who empowers a secular legislator to enact laws that permit wrongdoing and obligate people to it in the name of civil law? Is this not one of the greatest forms of following the steps of Satan?!
Allah has linked faith with referring to His law alone, as He said: ﴾But no, by your Lord, they will not believe until they make you judge in that over which they dispute among them and then find no discomfort within themselves from what you have judged and accept in full submission﴿ [an-Nisa: 65]. The point of evidence: True faith is not established except by referring to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) – that is, his Sunnah and Sharia – and referring to others contradicts the essence of faith.
The legal conclusion: Participation in parliamentary elections under systems that make legislation a human right through "the general will" or "the secular constitution" is a form of referring to the tyrant, and indeed, it is empowering him and agreeing to his legislations. It is explicit participation in a system that claims the right to enact laws in place of Allah, and this contradicts the essence of faith, and it may be practical shirk (associating partners with Allah) or greater depending on belief and intentions.
The believer is commanded to disbelieve in the tyrant: ﴾So whoever disbelieves in the tyrant and believes in Allah has grasped the strongest handhold﴿ [al-Baqarah: 256].
Participation in elections means aiding the disbeliever in falsehood.
﴾And do not cooperate in sin and aggression﴿ [al-Ma'idah: 2]. The point of evidence: Elections in the West are based on a legislative democratic foundation, meaning that the participating representative legislates laws and permits the forbidden (fornication, usury, homosexuality...) and suspends the law of Allah. Thus, participating in choosing him or holding a position within it is aiding in sin and legislating other than what Allah has revealed.
Third: Legislation is a right of Allah, and participating in a secular legislative system is an implicit acknowledgment of this right for others besides Allah.
Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾Or do they have partners who have established for them a religion that Allah has not permitted?﴿ [ash-Shura: 21]. The point of evidence: Participation in elections means entering a system that legislates without Allah, or aiding those who do so, and this is precisely what Allah has prohibited and called shirk.


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It is not permissible to hold a position of authority in a system that rules by other than what Allah has revealed:
Al-Bukhari narrated that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Whoever performs an action that is not in accordance with our command, it is rejected."
And Muslim narrated: "There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator." The point of evidence: political action in Western systems contradicts the command of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), because its origin is not legitimate, but rather conventional, based on opposing the Sharia and legislating what contradicts it; thus, it cannot be considered among the actions of Muslims, but is rejected.
Fifth: Fatwas prohibiting participation from scholars:
Sheikh Bakr Abu Zaid in his message "The Ruling on Belonging": "It is not permissible for a Muslim to participate in the democratic system because it is an acknowledgment of ruling by other than what Allah has revealed."
Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen: They rejected participation in elections that involve conventional legislation or empowering those who do not follow the law of Allah.
Sheikh Abu Ishaq al-Hawaini (Egypt): He said in one of his recorded lessons: "Democracy is based on the idea that what is lawful is what the parliament permits, and what is unlawful is what the parliament prohibits, and this is explicit disbelief in Allah, because Allah alone is the legislator… So how can I be a Muslim and acknowledge this disbelief?" He emphasizes that elections contribute to the entrenchment of the rule of tyranny.
Sheikh Abdul Salam Yasin (Morocco) – Founder of the Justice and Spirituality Movement: He said in the Prophetic Methodology: "Participation in conventional legislative institutions is an implicit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their laws, which are based on principles that grant sovereignty to humans and not to Allah." Despite his educational and political methodology, his stance on parliamentary elections under a conventional rule was explicitly rejecting.
Sheikh Omar Flatah (Tunisia) – From the scholars of Zaytuna: He clarified in one of his fatwas: "Running for office or voting in democratic systems that refer to humans and not to revelation is a form of referring to tyranny, and Allah has forbidden us from it in His saying: ﴾They wish to refer to tyranny﴿."
Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad Hussein (Jerusalem – Mufti of Palestine): He issued several fatwas through the Palestinian Fatwa House confirming that: "Any system that makes the people a source of legislation in place of divine revelation is a tyrannical system, and it is not permissible for a Muslim to participate in it," with the exception of elections that do not involve legislation (such as those related to purely service institutions).
Sheikh Abdul Qadir Auda (Egypt): In his book Islamic Criminal Legislation: "Legislation is a right exclusive to Allah, Exalted is He, and any human intervention in legislation is considered a serious transgression that the Sharia does not accept, and participation in it is an acknowledgment of it."


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Sheikh Sa‘īd Ḥawwā (Syria): In Jund Allah Thaqāfah wa Akhlāqan, denounced democracy as incompatible with Islam’s premise that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone. Seventh Argument: Necessity Cannot Justify Foundational Prohibitions
Qur’an: “Whoever is forced [by necessity], not intending transgression, incurs no sin.” (Al-Baqarah 2:173) This applies to physical necessity (food, drink)—not ideological participation in systems of ṭāghūt.
Imam al-Shāṭibī: “Necessities permit the forbidden only to the extent required.”
“The exception must not become the rule.”
Jurisprudential Conclusion: Participation in parliamentary elections within systems that assign legislative authority to human beings is a form of engaging in ḥukm al-ṭāghūt. It involves affirming and empowering a legal order that claims to replace divine revelation with popular will.
This contradicts the essence of faith (īmān), and depending on belief and intention, may constitute shirk akbar (major idolatry). The believer is commanded to disbelieve in ṭāghūt: “Whoever disbelieves in ṭāghūt and believes in Allah has grasped the firmest handhold...” (Al-Baqarah 2:256).
Seventh Argument: Muslims Have No Real Political Influence in the West
Muslims in Western countries lack meaningful political weight—not only Muslims, but all identity groups. The liberal system is designed to fragment society into minorities (whites, women, LGBTQ+, racial minorities, Muslims, Christians, etc.), none of whom wield real legislative influence. Actual power remains with political parties and elite capitalist circles that control media and authority. The idea that Muslims can achieve political leverage through the ballot box is an illusion inconsistent with how Western societies are structured.
Muslim participation is often used to legitimize the system and promote cultural assimilation, not to support Islam.
Political parties prevent Muslims from voting according to their religious principles and require adherence to party platforms that often contradict Sharī‘ah.
Conclusion
Participation in Western elections—whether by running for office or casting a vote—is not consistent with Shar‘ī guidelines. It:
Clearly violates the Qur’an and Sunnah.
Contradicts the positions of trusted early and contemporary scholars.
Enables evil and facilitates the alteration of religious principles.
Is based on speculative rational interests that do not justify what Allah has forbidden.


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It is incumbent upon the Muslim to remain steadfast in their faith, to distance themselves from falsehood and its people, and not to be deceived by hollow political slogans. The revealed texts of Islam are comprehensive, sufficient, and provide full guidance—free of the need for such illegitimate forms of political participation.
Response to the Claim that Prophet Yusuf (Joseph) Ruled by Non-Divine Law
Some advocates for participating in non-Islamic political systems cite the verse in which Yusuf عليه السلام says: “Appoint me over the storehouses of the land; indeed, I am trustworthy and knowledgeable” (Yusuf 12:55). They interpret this as evidence that Yusuf held a governmental position within a non-Islamic (pagan) system—therefore, justifying participation in secular systems. They also point to the verse: “He could not have taken his brother under the king’s law unless Allah willed it” (Yusuf 12:76), interpreting it to mean that Yusuf operated under the king’s law, not divine law.
They argue further: there is no scriptural restriction on applying this example to others, and since prophetic stories are for emulation, Yusuf's case supports the permissibility of such political involvement. They add: ruling by other than what Allah revealed is a fundamental principle that applies across all revelations—and Yusuf, while affirming “Judgment belongs only to Allah” (Yusuf 12:40), still took office!
Detailed Refutation:
1. Yusuf was a Prophet Sent with Divine Law Whose Mission Was to Rule by It
Qur’an: “Mankind was one community; then Allah sent the prophets as bringers of good tidings and warners and sent with them the Scripture in truth to judge between the people concerning that in which they differed.” (Al-Baqarah 2:213)
“We sent Our messengers with clear proofs and sent down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain justice.” (Al-Ḥadīd 57:25) The phrases “to judge” and “that people may maintain justice” indicate that one of the principal purposes of prophethood is the implementation of divine justice through revealed law.
It is inconceivable that Allah would appoint a prophet and then allow him to legislate or enforce man-made law—contrary to divine legislation—without rebuke or correction.
Yusuf was a divinely guided, infallible prophet. Any interpretation that contradicts this infallibility must be rejected.
Even if his law differed slightly from Islamic law, it would have been rooted in revelation. The general principle that prophets must govern by divine guidance rules out the possibility that Yusuf governed by non-divine law.


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The actions of the prophets are infallible, and accusing them of violating the nature of their prophethood, which is based on upholding the Book, as mentioned in the previously cited verses, contradicts infallibility. Therefore, if a speculative interpretation conflicts with the certainty of their infallibility, that interpretation is nullified and not acted upon, because the evidence of infallibility is definitive.
Joseph (peace be upon him) who says to the people: ﴾The judgment is only for Allah. He has commanded that you not worship except Him. That is the correct religion, but most people do not know﴿ cannot contradict them in this and accept the rule of various lords. In a similar manner, our master Shu'ayb says to his people whom he calls: ﴾And I do not want to contradict you in what I have forbidden you. I only intend to do good as much as I am able. And my success is only by Allah. Upon Him, I have relied, and to Him, I turn﴿. And the interpretation of this according to al-Qurtubi is: "It is not that I forbid you from something and then commit it, just as I do not abandon what I have commanded you."
Joseph was established in power, both by law and by authority.
Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾And thus We established Joseph in the land, that he might settle therein wherever he willed﴿ [Yūsuf: 56].
This Qur'anic text indicates complete empowerment and absolute authority in action, such that one cannot claim that he was compelled to enforce the law of the king or that he was under the authority of a system that prevents him from applying the law of Allah.
Joseph used the law of Jacob in the incident of detention.
Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾It was not for him to take his brother in the religion of the king except that Allah willed﴿ [Yūsuf: 76].
The royal law prohibited the enslavement of the thief, while Joseph (peace be upon him) sought to issue a ruling from his brothers according to the law of Jacob ﴾Whoever is found in his saddlebag, his punishment is due﴿. This is the only detailed case that mentions a ruling given by our master Joseph (peace be upon him). He acted according to the law of Allah, not the law of the king, and he actually opposed the royal law. Had it not been for the authority he had, he would not have been able to oppose the royal law; thus, this is evidence that he was ruling by the Sharia.
Secondly: The indication of the sequence of attributes (al-‘Azīz → the King)
At the beginning of the story and during Joseph's (peace be upon him) interaction with his brothers, the Qur'an describes him as al-‘Azīz (the Mighty) (Yūsuf: 63, 88).
After his family arrived and his parents were raised to the throne, the description changed to that he was granted kingship: ﴾My Lord, indeed You have given me of the kingdom﴿ [Yūsuf: 101].
This progression indicates that Joseph became a person of supreme authority, possibly at the level of a king, or fully delegated, which makes him free to implement whatever rulings he wishes.
Thirdly: Reflect on the reasoning of those who praise Joseph for participating in the rule of the tyrant.


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How is it conceivable that Allah would send a prophet to a people, then empower him on earth, and grant him authority, yet he does not implement the law of Allah, but rather rules the people by the laws of tyrants?
And how does Allah not hold him accountable? Rather, He praises him and makes him one of the chosen ones?!
This invalidates the claim that Joseph participated in the rule of disbelief or operated within its legislation.
❖ Fourth: Refuting the argument using the story of Joseph regarding the permissibility of entering secular parliaments
Joseph did not act according to the king's law; rather, he explicitly opposed it in a judicial context.
The incident of enslaving the thief can only be explained by the fact that he violated Egyptian law and acted according to the law of Jacob (peace be upon him).
Whoever claims that he worked under a disbelieving king and did not change anything has failed to reflect on the context of the texts.
Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾And the king said, "Bring him to me; I will employ him for myself." And when he spoke to him, he said, "Indeed, you are today among those established and trusted."﴿.
Allah, Exalted is He, said: ﴾And thus We established Joseph in the land.﴿.
﴾He may settle therein wherever he wills.﴿.
﴾My Lord, indeed You have given me [something] of sovereignty.﴿.
All of this indicates that he was not a subordinate being ruled, but rather a ruler who was empowered and held the decision-making authority.
❖ Fifth: Misapplying the analogy to an inappropriate context
Any attempt to apply the story of Joseph to the reality of contemporary disbelieving parliaments, or to the reality of political participation under tyrannical regimes that rule by other than what Allah has revealed, is a flawed application of analogy in an inappropriate context, because:
Joseph was neither coerced nor ruled; rather, he was a ruler.
Joseph did not submit to a secular constitution; rather, he submitted to the revelation of Allah.
Joseph ruled by the law of Allah, while secular parliaments legislate by other than His law.
Ancient societies, including Egypt during the Hyksos era or before the complete pharaonic period, did not know comprehensive constitutions, parliaments, or systems of legislative delegation as in modern systems.
Legislation was not an independent profession, and the king was not bound by a specific law. Rather, authority was absolute and individual, and governance was based on political decision-making.
The term "king" in the story of Joseph differs from "Pharaoh," which appears later in the story of Moses, and this indicates that the rule during Joseph's time was not pharaonic polytheism based on deifying the ruler, but rather it was


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A monarchical system based on sovereign administration relies on "ma'at" as a comprehensive principle for achieving balance and peace in the universe and society, rather than on fixed legislative texts or a written constitution, nor on comprehensive laws to regulate life, but rather on scattered legislations such as the legislation on the punishment for theft, for example. The king was the highest source of legislation, issuing orders according to his perceptions of "truth" and "justice," which were executed through a bureaucracy of ministers, priests, and deputies, without any original legislative support. This means that the laws were based on an authoritarian system rather than a legislative system, that is, through an executive order in specific matters that produced organizational effects, but did not rely on a religious foundation or a constitution, rather on the king's absolute authority. Thus, the delegation and empowerment that the king granted to Joseph (peace be upon him) when he made him the chief overseer of grain storage and crisis management allowed him to manage it as he wished. He could violate the situational royal sovereign legislation as he pleased without review from the king. Therefore, this situation cannot be applied to modern legislative systems that enact laws applicable in life and society across different life systems.
Summary:
The story of Joseph (peace be upon him) proves that he was empowered to govern, that he applied the law of Allah in judgment and politics, and that he was not part of a tyrannical system, nor of man-made laws that regulate the systems of life and society. Rather, it was merely a sovereign administration with a circumstantial nature, and he did not submit to the orders of an unjust king, but acted as he wished according to what his Lord commanded him. For this reason, Allah thanked him and praised him. Indeed, his story was a source of comfort for His Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) when he faced great harm, especially during the Year of Sorrow. The lesson at the end of the surah is that his patience on the truth and on the path based on insight from Allah, which he did not deviate from, will lead him to governance just as our master Joseph reached before him. This precise analysis shows that the inference against the context of the surah and the reason for its revelation is completely misguided! It is not permissible in any way to use his story as evidence for the permissibility of entering into man-made parliaments or for the permissibility of acting contrary to the law of Allah.
Did the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) approve of the Negus ruling by a law of disbelief?
We quote this section from the very valuable book: The Call to Islam, by Professor Ahmad al-Mahmoud:
"Indeed, whoever carries Islam sincerely and works to restore it to the reality of governance and life, whether as an individual or as a group, cannot participate in a rule of disbelief while claiming to work to dismantle it, because participation in a rule of disbelief that implements the systems and laws of disbelief is a reinforcement of those systems of disbelief, not a dismantling of them. Any argument presented to justify participation in a disbelieving government is nothing but self-deception before it is deception against Allah and the believers, especially when that argument contradicts the definitive and clear legal evidence."


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And indeed, it is a severe trial and a great sin for the bearer of the call to resort to taking the interest (maslaha) that his mind perceives, which has not been considered by the Sharia, as evidence to justify for himself the violation of the text that is definitively established and definitively indicative. Or to resort to what does not even reach the level of a dubious proof to take it as a justification for participating in a ruling of disbelief that rules by other than what Allah has revealed, even though this participation in the ruling of disbelief contradicts the definitive evidence that is definitively established and definitively indicative, which mandates ruling by what Allah has revealed and prohibits ruling by other than what Allah has revealed.
This is similar to taking the story of the Negus, whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) announced to the Companions on the day of his death and prayed the funeral prayer for him, as a justifying evidence for participating in a ruling of disbelief that rules by other than what Allah has revealed, going so far as to say that the Negus had embraced Islam during the time of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) and continued to rule by the system he had ruled by before he embraced Islam, even though it was a non-Islamic system. They cited six hadiths reported by al-Bukhari, which pertain to his death and the prayer for him, three of which were narrated by Jabir ibn Abdullah al-Ansari, and three by Abu Huraira. However, these six hadiths do not suffice to serve as a justifying evidence for participating in a ruling of disbelief that rules by the laws and systems of disbelief. The clarification of this is as follows.
1 – When al-Bukhari narrated these hadiths, he titled five of them as (The Chapter on the Death of the Negus), and the sixth he included in (The Chapter on Funerals). The six hadiths relate to the death of the Negus, the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) informing the Companions of his death, that he was a righteous man, that he was their brother, and the request for them to seek forgiveness for him and to pray the funeral prayer for him. This indicates that he was a Muslim.
2 – Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani commented in his book Fath al-Bari, the explanation of Sahih al-Bukhari, on al-Bukhari's title (The Death of the Negus) and his failure to title it with his Islam by saying: "It is perplexing that he – meaning al-Bukhari – did not title it with his Islam – meaning the Negus – and this is its place, and he titled it with his death because when the story of his Islam was not established with him, which is explicit in his death, he titled it so that it could be inferred from the prayer for him that he had embraced Islam."
3 – The wording of the hadiths that al-Bukhari reported indicates that the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) learned of the death of the Negus and his Islam on the day of his death through revelation, and it also indicates that the Companions did not know of his Islam and death until the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) informed them of that. In the hadith of Jabir, it is stated: "The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said when the Negus died: 'Today a righteous man has died, so stand and pray for your brother As'hama.'" In the hadith of Abu Huraira, it is mentioned: "The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) announced to them the Negus, the king of Abyssinia, on the day he died," which indicates that the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) learned of the death of the Negus and his Islam on the day of his death through revelation. And the statement of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) to the Companions as narrated by Jabir ibn Abdullah: "Today a righteous man has died" and his saying: "So stand and pray for your brother As'hama" indicates that they did not know of his Islam, because if they had known of his Islam, there would have been no need for the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) to use such expressions as "a righteous man" and "your brother," for he would not have used such expressions when calling them to pray for those who die among them from the Companions.


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4 – These hadiths indicate that the Negus (al-Najashi) had embraced Islam shortly before his death, but they do not specify when his conversion occurred. Their wording suggests that the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) learned of his death and his Islam on the day he died through revelation, as we mentioned earlier. There is no authentic report indicating that the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) informed others of the Negus's Islam at any other time.
5 – These six hadiths do not indicate that the Negus whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) mourned to the Companions and for whom he performed the funeral prayer was the same Negus who was the ruler of Abyssinia at the time of the Muslims' migration there. Furthermore, there is nothing in them to suggest that he is the same Negus to whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) sent the letter inviting him to Islam, because the term "Negus" is not a proper name for a specific individual, but rather a title given to any ruler who governs Abyssinia, as mentioned by al-Nawawi in the twelfth volume of his commentary on Sahih Muslim, and as noted by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani in the third volume of his book Al-Isabah.
6 – It is stated in the twelfth volume of Sahih Muslim in al-Nawawi's commentary that the Negus to whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) sent the letter inviting him to Islam at the end of the sixth year of the Hijra after returning from the Battle of Hudaybiyyah is not the same Negus for whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) performed the funeral prayer. The text of the hadith states: "… from Anas that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) wrote to Khosrow, to Caesar, to the Negus, and to every tyrant inviting them to Allah, the Exalted. And he is not the Negus for whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) prayed." From this hadith, it becomes clear that the Negus for whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) prayed is different from the Negus to whom the Muslims migrated to Abyssinia to live in his vicinity, and he is not the Negus to whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) sent a letter at the end of the sixth year inviting him to Islam. Rather, he is the Negus who came to the throne after the death of the Negus to whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) sent a letter with Amr ibn Umayyah al-Damri inviting him to Islam, who did not respond to the Messenger's invitation and did not embrace Islam. If he had responded to the Messenger and embraced Islam, the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) would have informed the Companions of that, and he would have prayed for him. Ja'far ibn Abi Talib and the emigrants with him would have known of his Islam, as they returned to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) in the seventh year after the conquest of Khaybar, that is, after the Messenger sent the letter to the Negus. If he had embraced Islam, it would have been a cause for joy among the Muslims, especially after Allah granted them victory at Khaybar. The Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) would have given them glad tidings of his Islam, and it would not have been limited to his statement upon Ja'far's arrival: "I do not know which of them I should be more pleased with: the conquest of Khaybar, or the arrival of Ja'far" [Sirah Ibn Hisham]. He would have added to that: "Or the Islam of the Negus." However, he did not mention the Negus in this hadith, even though the situation would have warranted it had he responded to his invitation and embraced Islam.
7 – Those who claim that the Negus for whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) performed the funeral prayer is the same Negus to whom the Muslims migrated and sought refuge, and the same Negus to whom the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) sent the letter inviting him to Islam at the end of the sixth year of the Hijra have erred in their assertion. This misconception arose from the fact that the Negus to whom the Muslims migrated was praised and commended by the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) when he described him to those who were asked to migrate to him: "He is a king under whom no one is wronged, and his land is a land of truth" [Sirah Ibn Hisham]. This is also due to the fact that he provided good protection to those Muslims who migrated to him, ensuring their safety so that they could worship Allah without fear from anyone, and because he refused to hand them over to the Messenger's emissaries.


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Quraysh, after they requested him to do so against the wishes of his nobles, prevented them from both, and protected them, saying to them: "You are safe in my land; whoever insults you will be liable." And regarding his comment on Ja'far's response to him when he asked what the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) had brought to them, he said: "Indeed, this and what Jesus brought comes from the same source." And regarding Ja'far's response the next day when he asked him what they say about Jesus, he took a stick from the ground and said: "By Allah, I do not say anything about Jesus, son of Mary, except this stick" [Sirah Ibn Hisham]. They mistakenly thought from all of this that he had converted to Islam, even though the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) did not declare that he had converted, just as Umm Salamah, the wife of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), who was among the emigrants to Abyssinia, did not mention that he had converted when she spoke about him and what happened to them in the land of Abyssinia, where she said: "When we arrived in the land of Abyssinia, we were under the protection of the best neighbor: the Negus. We were safe in our religion, and we worshiped Allah, the Exalted, without being harmed, nor did we hear anything we disliked... And she said: By Allah, we were upon that when a man from Abyssinia came to dispute with his kingdom. She said: By Allah, we did not know a sadness that was greater upon us than the sadness we felt at that time, fearing that this man would prevail over the Negus and that a man who did not know our rights as the Negus knew them would come. And she said: After Allah aided the Negus against his enemy, and established him in his land, by Allah, we did not know a joy that was greater than that joy. She said: The Negus returned after Allah had destroyed his enemy, and he was established in his land, and the affairs of Abyssinia were secured for him, so we were in a good situation with him until we came to the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) while he was in Mecca" [Sirah Ibn Hisham]. Umm Salamah's narration does not indicate that the Negus had converted to Islam.
On one hand, it seems that those who said that the Negus, whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) prayed for, is the same Negus who sent the emigrants, and the Negus who sent him the letter inviting him to Islam, did not take into account the narration of Anas ibn Malik, which was reported by Muslim in his Sahih, in which it is stated: "The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) wrote to Khosrow and to Caesar and to the Negus and to every tyrant inviting them to Allah, and it is not the Negus whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) prayed for."
As for the two letters mentioned by Muhammad Hamidullah in his book (Political Documents of the Prophetic Era), one is that the Negus wrote to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) a letter in which he declared his Islam and his readiness to come to the Messenger if he commanded him to do so, and that he sent to him his son Arha ibn al-Asham ibn Abhar, and this letter was sent while the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) was in Mecca. As for the second letter, it is reported that the Negus sent it to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) with those returning from Abyssinia from the companions of the Messenger while he was in Medina.
These two letters are not mentioned in any of the authentic hadith books. The author of (Political Documents of the Prophetic Era) stated that he took these documents from the historical books of al-Tabari, al-Qalqashandi, Ibn Kathir, and others, and he did not mention that he took either of them from any book of hadith. Historical books are not reliable, as they do not concern themselves with the verification of hadith like the books of hadith do; they gather their news like one who gathers firewood at night and does not know whether he is picking up a stick or a snake. Therefore, these two letters have no value, especially since they contradict the narration of Anas reported by Muslim, and the narration of Umm Salamah regarding the Negus and the emigrants in Abyssinia, and the lack of mention of the emigrants to Abyssinia, the last of whom to return was Ja'far, and any news indicating that the Negus had converted to Islam, even though Ja'far returned to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) in the seventh year after the conquest of Khaybar, and after the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) had sent letters to the kings and princes. Therefore, these two letters are not valid, nor can they be used as evidence.


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During that brief period, he embraced Islam in secret, and no one was aware of his conversion—not even the Prophet ﷺ. The Prophet was only informed of his death and his Islam through divine revelation on the day of his death, as indicated by the wording of the six hadiths recorded by al-Bukhārī regarding his passing.
Because of the short time he lived as a Muslim before dying, he had no opportunity to learn the rulings of Islam. And the Prophet’s ﷺ unawareness of his conversion meant he did not send him any instructions regarding what he should observe or implement. Thus, this case cannot serve as evidence for anyone who permits himself to participate in a system of disbelieving governance that rules by other than what Allah has revealed. Any claim to the contrary is invalid and refuted. Conclusion
From all the above, it is clear that: The Najāshī who accepted Islam and was prayed over by the Prophet ﷺ is not definitively proven to be the same ruler to whom the Muslims first migrated, or to whom the Prophet ﷺ sent his letter. The Islam of Najāshī likely occurred privately and late in his life.
He did not have time, ability, or perhaps even awareness to implement Islamic rule.
The Prophet ﷺ did not approve of ruling by other than Allah’s law—his silence on Najāshī’s Islam until after his death is not an endorsement of his governance.
Thus, this cannot serve as valid evidence for participating in modern-day regimes that legislate in opposition to Islamic law. Any such claim is invalidated by authentic textual and historical evidence.
A Comprehensive Study on the Juristic Principle of "The Lesser of Two Evils" or "The Lesser of Two Harms" Foundational Introduction: The principle of "the lesser of two evils" or "the lesser of two harms" is among the well-known legal maxims frequently cited by jurists. However, it must be precisely understood within the confines of its strict Sharia-based regulations and not misused as a blanket justification for deviations or political participation in systems of disbelief, as some modern Islamic movements have done. This study explores the origin of the principle, the conditions for its application, the supporting evidence, and examples from foundational juristic texts such as those of al-Ghazali and Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam. It also critiques the contemporary misapplication of the principle and refutes its wrongful use.
First: Definition of the Principle and Its Juristic Scope
The Principle: If a morally responsible person (mukallaf) is compelled to commit one of two prohibitions (i.e., cannot avoid both), then he must choose the one that is less harmful.
Its Origin in the Qur'an:


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"Allah does not burden a soul beyond its capacity" (al-Baqarah: 286)
"So fear Allah as much as you are able" (al-Taghabun: 16)
Core Condition: It must be genuinely impossible to abstain from both prohibited actions, and the mukallaf must inevitably fall into one of them.
Second: Juristic Conditions Governing the Principle
Impossibility of Avoiding Both Harms: It must be impossible for the individual to avoid both forbidden acts.
Determination of the Lesser Harm Must Be Sharia-Based: The evaluation must be grounded in revealed law (Sharia), not based on mere whims or utilitarian reasoning.
The Individual Must Be Powerless to Avoid Both Except Through a Greater Harm: He must be unable to avoid both without incurring a more severe consequence.
Documenting the Conditions for Applying the Principle(1):
First: Jurists' Statements Affirming the Condition
Hanafi School: Ibn Nujaym in al-Ashbah wa al-Naza'ir (p. 96): "When two evils conflict, the greater one is avoided by committing the lesser—if there is no alternative but to commit one."
Al-Zayla'i in Tabyin al-Haqa'iq (6/22) quoting al-Kasani: "The lesser harm is committed in cases of necessity, when both cannot be avoided."
Maliki School: Al-Qarafi in al-Furuq (4/204): "If a person is forced into one of two prohibitions and cannot avoid both, he must commit the one with lesser harm."
Al-Mawwaq in al-Taj wa al-Iklil (8/218): "Committing the lesser of two harms is permissible in necessity, provided both cannot be avoided."
Shafi'i School: Al-Ghazali in al-Mustasfa (1/286): "When two evils conflict and one must be committed, then the lesser is committed."
Al-Suyuti in al-Ashbah wa al-Naza'ir (p. 117): "If two evils occur together and both cannot be avoided, then the lesser is committed."
Hanbali School: Ibn al-Qayyim in I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in (3/14): "The Sharia mandates committing the lesser harm when one of two must be chosen and the greater must be avoided."
Al-Buhuti in Kashshaf al-Qina' (6/298): "If one is compelled to commit one of two evils and cannot avoid both, he commits the lesser."
__________
(1) Main references: al-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir (principle 50); Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn (3/10-20); al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq (4/199-208); Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir (pp. 94-98); al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‘ (6/296-301).


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Second: Scholars’ Explanations of the Condition
Meaning of ‘Necessity’:
Ibn Abidin in his Hashiyah (5/45): "Necessity means fear of perishing or losing a body part if the prohibition is not violated."
Condition of ‘No Exit’: Al-Qarafi in Anwar al-Buruq (4/200): "Committing the lesser of two harms is not permissible unless avoiding both is impossible. If both can be avoided, neither should be committed."
Verification by Ibn Taymiyyah: In Majmu‘ al-Fatawa (20/58): "When compelled to commit prohibited acts, the concession applies only to what is absolutely necessary. If one can avoid both, he must do so."
Third:
Juristic Applications Clarifying the Condition
Case
Reason
Applicable?
Theft under armed threat
Cannot avoid death or theft
Yes
Participation in a disbelieving government
Can abstain without harm
No
Eating dead meat in the desert
Only options are death or eating carrion Yes
Conclusion: The foundational condition—as affirmed by the majority of jurists—is:
"That the legally responsible person (mukallaf) is inevitably compelled to commit one of the prohibited actions, with
no ability to avoid both."
This rests on key legal maxims:
Necessities permit the prohibited (to the extent of the necessity).
Harm is not removed by equal or greater harm.
Greater harm is removed by lesser harm (only under necessity).
Third: Valid Examples from Juristic Texts


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Difficult Childbirth:
If the life of the mother or fetus is at risk and one must be sacrificed to save the other, the lesser harm—such as saving the mother—is chosen, as noted by scholars.
Murder under Coercion: Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam stated: "If a person is coerced into killing another Muslim, he must rather suffer death himself, for killing oneself is a lesser harm than unjustly killing another."
Preventing Evil That Causes Missing an Obligation:
If preventing murder or adultery is only possible by missing an obligatory prayer, then preventing the evil takes precedence, as it holds greater Sharia weight.
Fourth: Refuting the Political Misuse of the Principle
Invoking the Principle to Justify Participation in Disbelieving Governance:
Some preachers today justify parliamentary elections, supporting secular governments or parties, or endorsing legislation contrary to Sharia by claiming to "prevent a greater harm."
Refutation: This is invalid for two reasons:
Condition of Compulsion is Not Met: A Muslim can abstain from voting or participating in disbelieving governance, and abstention is legally possible.
It is Forbidden to Delegate Legislative Authority to Anyone Who Rules by Other Than God's Revelation: Parliamentary representation involves authorizing the legislator to enact laws—if this is granted religious legitimacy, it constitutes shirk (associating others with God in His legislative right).
3. The Problem of Legislative Delegation (Authorization)
Juristic Argument:
Voting is an explicit authorization for the representative to legislate on behalf of the voter. This makes the voter a partner in every law passed by parliament, as stated in the verse: "Or do they have partners who have legislated for them in religion that which Allah has not permitted?" (al-Shura: 21).
Political Analysis:
Parliamentary systems operate on the principle of a general mandate, which gives the elected member authority to vote on all matters during their term (4–5 years), not only those included in their campaign promises.
Real-World Example:
In 2003, 80% of Labour Party MPs in the UK—including Muslim MPs—voted in favor of the Iraq invasion, despite mass Muslim opposition.


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In 2019, the British Parliament voted to legalize same-sex marriage, with support from parties that included Islamic movements.
4. The Illusion of Preventing Greater Harm
Debunking the "Preventing Homosexuality in Education" Argument:
Even if a Muslim MP succeeded in removing a clause on homosexuality from a curriculum, this does not prevent:
The same education system from promoting Darwinism and secularism as absolute truths. In our book The Origin of the Universe: A Rational, Scientific, and Empirical Proof of the Creator’s Existence, we addressed the issue of “Exclusionary Secular Dictatorship and Intelligent Design” by examining the case of Georgia, USA. There, church-supported communities fought to place stickers on biology textbooks stating that "evolution is a theory, not a fact," but a federal judge ruled in 2005 that such stickers were unconstitutional and ordered their removal. In another 2005 case, the Dover School Board attempted to present "Intelligent Design" as an alternative to Darwinian evolution, offering a 60-second statement and library references. The court ruled this a violation of the First Amendment and banned it. These two cases demonstrate that educational agendas follow a strict secular doctrine that uses the separation of religion and state to silence any epistemic alternative—even if it is scientific—on the grounds of suspected religious association.
The eventual legalization of homosexuality in law (as seen in 35 Western countries since 2000).
The proliferation of moral decadence through media (e.g., Netflix, TikTok), which wields greater influence than schools.
UNESCO 2021 Report: "70% of Western social media content is inconsistent with conservative religious values." Historical Irony:
In France in 2013, political parties involving Muslims supported the same-sex marriage law under the pretext of "focusing on more important issues like Islamophobia"—yet both laws were enacted together! The Deception of Minority Political Influence Structural Analysis of Liberal Systems (Based on Robert Dahl’s Theory of Elite Pluralism):
The Western political system is governed by a "Triangle of Domination": The Triangle of Hegemony in Western Politics Arabic Term
English Translation Expansion & Key Actors
أصحاب رأس المال Financial Elites • Hedge fund managers (e.g., BlackRock, Vanguard)• Tech oligarchs (e.g., Bezos, Musk, Zuckerberg)• Corporate lobbyists (e.g., PhRMA for Big Pharma, NRA for arms industry)
الأحزاب الحاكمة Ruling Political Parties


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• Establishment wings of major parties (e.g., GOP’s McConnell faction, Democrats’ Clintonite bloc)• Party whips enforcing donor-aligned voting• Bipartisan consensus on core policies (e.g., military spending, Israel support) لوبيات الضغط الصهيوني Pro-Israel Lobbying Complex
• AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee)• Democratic Majority for Israel (DMFI)• Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC)• CAMERA (media watchdog silencing Palestine criticism) Mechanisms of Control Financial Pipeline
Example: 91% of U.S. Senate elections (2020) were won by candidates with higher corporate funding (OpenSecrets data).
"When Wall Street speaks, politicians kneel." — Senator Bernie Sanders (2019)
Party Discipline
U.K. Conservative MPs voting against Israeli sanctions (2023) faced deselection threats from party whips.
Lobby Enforcement
AIPAC spent $34M in 2022 to defeat progressive critics of Israel (The Intercept).
Academic Validation
Concept
Theorist/Study
Key Finding
Plutocratic Entrenchment
Princeton Study (Gilens & Page, 2014)
"Economic elites dominate policy outcomes; average citizen’s influence is near zero."
Iron Law of Oligarchy
Robert Michels (1911)
"All parties evolve into oligarchies controlled by elites."
Zionist Hegemony
Stephen Walt & John Mearsheimer (2007)
"U.S. Middle East policy driven by Israel lobby, not national interest."


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Why Minorities Remain Marginalized
Reality Check:
Muslim advocacy groups (e.g., CAIR) spend ~$3M/year on lobbying vs. AIPAC’s $100M+ (FEC 2022).
Result: 97% of U.S. Congress supports Israel unconditionally despite 72% Muslim voter opposition (Pew 2023).
Case Study: U.S. Congress Voting Patterns
Issue
Corporate/Pro-Israel Position
Progressive/Muslim Position
Outcome
Military aid to Israel
$3.8B/year unconditional
Ceasefire + conditions
98% approval
Student loan relief
Blocked
$10k+ debt cancellation
Blocked 5 times
Palestinian statehood
Opposed
Supported
0% success since 1948
Conclusion
This triangle operates as a closed feedback loop:
Elites fund campaigns → 2. Parties pass elite-friendly laws → 3. Lobbies protect the system.Minorities are structurally excluded from core power nodes – making "participation" in this system a legitimization of hegemony, not a path to change. As Noam Chomsky notes:
"The smart way to keep people passive is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow lively debate within that spectrum."
Special Terminology
Plutocratic Entrenchment = الهيمنة البولغاركية (i.e., rule of the wealthy)
Deselection threats = تهديدات بالإقصاء من المقعد الانتخابي
Lobby Enforcement = فرض الضغط السياسي (i.e., the operational mechanism of lobbying)
Harvard University Study (2020): “The influence of the Zionist lobby on the U.S. Congress surpasses that of all other ethnic minorities combined by a factor of 12.”
A Stark Example


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In 2021, 98% of the U.S. Congress voted in favor of increasing military aid to Israel—despite 72% of Muslim voters opposing their parties’ stances.
The Fallacy of Partial Gains vs. Strategic Losses
Case Study: The Palestinian Issue
Western political parties—even those deemed “moderate”—maintain fixed and unwavering positions on core issues:
Military support for Israel.
Framing Palestinian resistance as “terrorism.” Pursuit of normalization with the Zionist entity.
Brookings Institute Study:
“86% of all U.S. congressional resolutions concerning Palestine since 1948 favored Israel—regardless of which party was in power.”
The Mosque Licensing Deception
In Britain, 40 mosques were shut down between 2001 and 2020 under the pretext of “countering extremism”—despite the presence of Muslim MPs in Parliament.
Civil rights are not attained through legislative authorization, but rather through:
The judiciary (e.g., the hijab ban in France was contested in the European Court
of Human Rights).
Media pressure campaigns.
Popular grassroots mobilization—none of which require parliamentary empowerment or representation.
Second: Fulfilling Detailed Demands
A. Weighing the Two Harms:
Governing by Disbelief vs. Partial Gains
Dimension
Harm Resulting from Participation
Benefit of Non-Participation
Religious Legitimacy
Delegating authority to legislate disbelief (a collective sin)
Avoiding legitimization of the secular system
Political Impact


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Strengthening the secular regime
Depriving the system of its “pluralistic” cover
Existential Issues
Endorsing decisions on war and normalization
Freedom from responsibility for the regime’s crimes
Gains
Token achievements in secondary matters (e.g., licenses, temporary curriculum tweaks) Upholding principled stance with mass popular respect Conclusion:
Temporary or superficial gains cannot offset strategic losses, especially on matters of existential weight (such as military aid to Israel), for which not only the Muslim MP is held accountable, but also the voter who empowered them.
B. The Deception of Electoral Platforms
Practical Reality:
Political parties routinely make critical decisions without returning to their voters, particularly in:
Foreign policy (e.g., relations with Israel).
Moral legislation (e.g., abortion, LGBTQ issues).
Examples:
Canadian PM Justin Trudeau legalized marijuana in office, though it was never mentioned in his 2015 campaign platform.
Spanish PM Pedro Sánchez legalized euthanasia in 2021 despite 70% of his voters opposing the move.
C. The Myth of “Change from Within”
1. Max Weber’s “Iron Cage” Theory:
Modern bureaucratic systems compel
entrants to adopt the system’s core values—even if they initially entered in opposition.
2. Cambridge University Study (2022):


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“82% of Islamic political parties that participated in governance (e.g., in Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait) abandoned over 60% of their Islamic platform under pressure from international institutions.”
3. The “Minimum Threshold of Acceptability” Rule:
To be recognized as a legitimate political actor within the system, a party must adopt liberal dogmas such as: Absolute equality (as opposed to gender or moral distinctions rooted in religion).
Unrestricted freedom of expression (even when blasphemous).
Secularism (separation of religion from state governance).
Strategic Approach for Confrontation for Muslims Living in the West
1. Global Strategic Objective: Re-Establishment of the Islamic Khilāfah
Support the intellectual and political work for reviving the Islamic Caliphate in the Muslim world. This is the ultimate solution to all systemic problems facing Muslims—whether political, social, or economic—as it would restore the implementation of Islam comprehensively in governance, law, economy, and society.


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The collapse of secularism’s effects—injustice, identity crises, social breakdown—will naturally follow the re-implementation of divine law.
2. Cultivating Deep Islamic Understanding in the West
Educate Muslims on core Islamic beliefs, law, and political theory, especially the invalidity of secularism, the concept of divine sovereignty (ḥākimiyyah), and the obligation of implementing Islam comprehensively.
Reconnect Muslims with the classical tradition through structured halaqat, courses, and books covering:
Usul al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory)
Islamic worldview (tasawwur islami)
Islamic systems of governance, economy, and social life
Refutations of liberalism, nationalism, and modernist distortions
3. Preservation and Assertion of Islamic Identity
Resist forced assimilation by strengthening Islamic identity markers:
Arabic language
Islamic dress
Distinct Islamic moral codes (ḥayā’, gender interaction, family structure)
Teach Muslim youth to critically challenge secular-liberal norms, including:
Individualism
Gender ideology
Moral relativism
Promote pride in Muslim civilization and history—not as nostalgia, but as an intellectual and practical alternative to Western models.
4. Constructive Social Engagement Without Compromise
Engage positively in society: contribute to public welfare (health, education, economy) in a manner that showcases Islamic ethics.
Avoid political entanglement in secular legislative systems that legitimize kufr laws.
Uphold Islamic ethics in interactions, volunteerism, and professional life without diluting religious principles.
Advocate for Muslims’ civil rights through lawful and public means—media, legal advocacy, petitions—without aligning with secular ideologies.
5. Intellectual Counter-Narrative and Da‘wah
Build a coherent Islamic counter-narrative that refutes:


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Secular democracy
Feminism, LGBTQ+ normalization
Religious pluralism as theological relativism
Train Muslim youth and activists to be confident intellectual carriers of Islam, capable of articulating:
Islam as a system (not just spirituality)
Islamic governance as a viable solution
The moral and spiritual bankruptcy of Western liberalism
6. Rejection of Integration Through Compromise
Categorically reject participation in systems that:
Legislate contrary to Shariah
Demand moral compromise (e.g., interest-based economics)
Normalize secular definitions of “moderate Islam”
Publicly expose the contradiction between Islamic beliefs and Western liberalism, including its use of “tolerance” as a tool to suppress religious truth.
7. Support for the Oppressed Muslim Ummah
Build moral, financial, and informational support networks for oppressed Muslims globally:
Palestine, Uyghurs, Kashmir, Rohingya, etc.
Raise awareness of colonial legacies, ongoing political subjugation, and how Khilāfah is the only strategic solution.
Counter the narrative of “Islamic extremism” used to criminalize Islamic political identity.
A Decisive Jurisprudential Maxim:
“Harm cannot be removed by an equivalent or greater harm.”— Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn
Political Recommendation
Emphasis must be placed on the “power of rejection” (i.e., boycott)—an effective strategy that compels regimes to concede, as seen in campaigns to boycott products that support Israel. This approach proves far more successful than participation, which is invariably marred by concessions.
This analysis thus shows that participation in secular systems of governance is not “the lesser of two evils.” Rather, it is a recurring evil—one that legitimizes disbelief and implicates the Muslim in the sin of legislating against divine law. And God knows best.


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Contemporary Deviant Applications
1. Participation of Islamic Movements in Democratic Governance Claim: Participation prevents the dominance of secularists.
Response: Such participation constitutes a legislative mandate; mere entry into the system affirms and entrenches it—it is not a necessity.
Deconstructing the “Penetration” Argument:
The democratic system is built on “institutional equilibrium,” meaning that participation within it signals recognition of its legitimacy, not resistance to it. According to David Easton’s theory of Institutional Legitimacy, “the participant in a system becomes a guardian of it, not a challenger.”
Contemporary Example: Tunisia (2011–2021)
Participation of Ḥarakat al-Nahḍah (The Ennahda Movement) in parliament did not prevent the passage of laws violating the Sharīʿah—such as equal inheritance and legalizing adoption by homosexuals.
Outcome: The movement transformed from a “reformist movement” into a “supporter of the status quo,” according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2022).
New Jurisprudential Argument:
Participation entails swearing allegiance to a secular constitution, which signifies a shift in loyalty from divine law to man-made law. “And do not obey one whose heart We have made heedless of Our remembrance and who follows his own desires.” (Sūrat al-Kahf, 18:28)
Permitting the Election of the “Lesser Evil” Secular Candidate
Response: What is forbidden cannot be represented, nor granted legitimacy through voting.
Analysis of the Modern Social Contract:
In a democratic system, voting is not merely the “selection of an individual,” but a delegation of authority to form the 'General Will’, as per Rousseau.
This renders the voter a co-author of every law passed by parliament during its term.
Hence, the voter is also responsible for the MP’s crimes, such as voting in support of Israel or pro-LGBTQ legislation, marijuana ...etc. Unprecedented Empirical Evidence: Yale University Study (2023) across 100 countries found:
“Parliamentarians elected under claims of ‘moderation’ vote in favor of morally corrupt laws in 89% of cases, under pressure from their party blocs.”
Jurisprudential Paradox:
If two candidates exist—a disbeliever and a wicked transgressor—abstaining from participation is the true “lesser evil,” because:


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Refusing to vote undermines the legitimacy of the system, as in Algeria’s 2019 elections where turnout dropped to 40%.
Participation incurs two sins: aiding in transgression and legitimizing the rule of laws other than what Allah has revealed.
Appointing Sharīʿah Judges Within Secular Systems
Response: A judge in this context is bound by secular law, and thereby enforces disbelief. Muslims must not be deceived by claims of “harm reduction.”
Exposing the Structural Illusion:
The judge in secular systems is a prisoner of procedural codes, not religious edicts.
He is obliged to prioritize the state constitution over Sharīʿah law. Example: Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution states: “The principles of Sharīʿah are a main source of legislation”—i.e., not binding.
The judge is prohibited from enforcing ḥudūd (Islamic penal codes) such as apostasy or adultery, under the guise of “individual freedoms.”
Court Structure Evidence:
In Malaysia’s dual court system:
Sharīʿah courts are restricted to personal status issues (marriage, divorce, inheritance).
They are barred from adjudicating existential matters (economics, politics, criminal law).
The New Moral Predicament:
If the judge rules based on secular law:
In homosexuality cases: he recognizes its legitimacy.
In usury cases: he validates and enforces bank-based transactions.
This reveals that the claim of “reducing harm” is a mirage—it actually multiplies the sin.
Key Jurisprudential Alerts
The ability to abstain nullifies the necessity clause: If a third, lawful path exists, it becomes obligatory; the excuse of “necessity” cannot be invoked lightly.
Invoking ease without detailed evidence is simply chasing dispensations without discipline—a path scholars considered ruinous. Maslahah (public interest) does not abrogate textual proofs:
Maslahah (public interest) does not abrogate textual proofs: It must be governed by what the Sharīʿah affirms. If it contradicts definitive evidence, it is dismissed.


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A Comprehensive Conclusion
The principle of “choosing the lesser of two evils” is not a blanket license to bypass divine rulings, nor is it a legitimate justification to normalize what is categorically prohibited. It is a precise and narrowly applicable principle, bound by strict conditions, and only to be used in genuine cases of necessity—and only after exhausting all other legitimate Sharʿī alternatives. To use it outside its context is to engage in human legislation masquerading as Sharīʿah, opening the door to base desires and blurring the line between ḥalāl and ḥarām.
Imām al-ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al-Salām said: “A harm is not removed by a greater harm unless it is absolutely unavoidable and its prevention takes precedence.”
Thus, the greater harm lies not in committing a wrong, but in clothing that wrong in legitimacy. Participation does not eliminate the evil—it rather transforms it from an external imposition to an internalized, systemically legitimized choice, and that is the greater calamity.
And God knows best. May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, and upon his family and companions.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Certain applications of “Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt” (Minority Jurisprudence) have led to dangerous methodological concessions in established rulings, particularly regarding marital law and engagement with secular systems—under the pressures of modern reality and in the name of “public interest.” In practice, maslahah has been distorted from a Sharʿī principle grounded in sound legal methodology into a rationalist utilitarianism, tied to Western norms and pressures, resulting in:
Contradicting definitive textual proofs and scholarly consensus.
Undermining foundational creedal tenets, such as ruling by divine law and loyalty and disavowal (al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ).
Weakening moral sensitivity toward categorical prohibitions.
Presenting a distorted image of Islam’s “flexibility”—misconstrued as limitless interpretability.
The real challenge for Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt is not in compromising legal foundations, but in crafting innovative, Sharʿī-compliant solutions within the framework of definitive textual principles and disciplined legal reasoning (uṣūl al-fiqh), not at their expense. This demands:
Unwavering commitment to Sharʿī constants—no matter the pressure.
Strict regulation of the use of necessity, need, and maslahah—within the bounds of Islamic jurisprudence.
Genuine efforts to develop viable Sharʿī alternatives, such as real Islamic financing solutions not affiliated with the capitalist system, recognized Islamic arbitration tribunals, and effective Islamic marriage initiatives.
A clear distinction between lawful facilitation of Islam’s practice in the West and compromising divine law for comfort.
A courageous internal critique of the methodological deviations within minority jurisprudence institutions.


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Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt will only fulfill its religious and societal purpose if it remains anchored in the certainties of revelation, offering a coherent jurisprudential vision that merges Sharʿī authenticity with practical realism—not one where rationalist utilitarianism erases immutable rulings.


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Contents
Refutation of Minority Jurisprudence and Its Dangers to Muslim Minorities! ... 2
Methodological Introduction: The Dangers of Minority Jurisprudence and the Breakdown of Usulī Discipline ... 2
Minority Jurisprudence Between Shar‘ī Necessity and Methodological Compromise ... 2
From Usulī Discipline to Methodological Disintegration! ... 3
Manifestations of This Methodological Breakdown in Minority Jurisprudence: ... 4
Conclusion: ... 6
Practical Examples That Demonstrate the Danger of Building Upon Minority Jurisprudence: ... 7
First: The Fatwa Permitting Interest-Based Loans to Purchase a Home or Car: ... 7
Analysis of the Methodology of Concession: ... 13
Second: Altering the Rulings of Zakat ... 15
Third: Equal Inheritance Between Males and Females ... 15
Fourth: Same-Sex Marriage (LGBTQ+) ... 15
Fifth: Donating to Causes Contrary to the Sharia ... 16
Sixth: Voting in Hijab/Niqab Polls ... 16
Seventh: The “Shari‘ah-Compliant” Swimsuit / Swimming ... 16
Eighth: Permitting a Muslim Woman to Marry a Non-Muslim (a Kitābī Disbeliever) in the West: ... 17
Ninth: Being Forced to Resort to Secular Courts in Marital Disputes and Recognizing Their Absolute Authority: ... 18
Tenth: Participation in Western Elections and Voting for the Ruling Secular Parties: ... 19
The Basic Principle in Legislation Is That Sovereignty Belongs to Allah, and Participating in Man-Made Systems Breaches This Principle ... 19


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The Prohibition of Ruling by Other Than What Allah Has Revealed, and of Enabling It by Voting or Participation: ... 20
Participating in Elections Means Helping the Disbeliever in Falsehood ... 21
It Is Not Permitted to Hold Office in a System That Rules by Other Than What Allah Has Revealed: ... 22
Western Political Reality Does Not Allow Muslims Any Real Influence ... 23
Reply to Their Use of the Story of Yusuf, Peace Be upon Him, and the Claim That He Ruled by Other Than Allah’s Law: ... 24
The Detailed Reply: ... 24
Did the Messenger ﷺ Approve of the Najāshī Ruling by a Law of Disbelief? ... 27
A Comprehensive Study in Establishing the Principle of “the Lesser of Two Evils” or “the Lesser of Two Harms”: ... 31
Foundational Introduction: ... 31
First: Definition of the Principle and Its Juristic Scope ... 31
Second: The Principle’s Juristic Conditions ... 32
Documenting the Conditions for Applying This Principle: ... 32
Third: Valid Examples from the Books of the Scholars ... 33
Fourth: Refuting the Deviant Political Use of the Principle ... 34
Invoking the Principle to Justify Participation in Governance by Disbelief: ... 34
Refuting the Argument of “Preventing Homosexuality in Education”: ... 35
The Deception of the Political Influence of Minorities ... 35
Academic Verification ... 36
Why Do Minorities Remain Marginalized? ... 37
The Fallacy of Partial Gains Against Strategic Losses ... 38
The Palestinian Cause as an Example: ... 38


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The Deception of Mosque Licensing: ... 38
Second: Fulfilling the Detailed Demands ... 38
A. Weighing the Two Harms: Ruling by Disbelief Against Partial Gains ... 38
B. The Deception of Electoral Platforms ... 39
C. The Myth of “Change from Within” ... 39
Conclusion: The Strategy of Sharʿī Confrontation ... 40
Political Recommendation: ... 42
Fifth: Contemporary Deviant Examples ... 43
Participation of Islamic Movements in Democratic Government, on the Claim That It “Prevents the Secularists’ Overreach”: ... 43
Permitting the Election of “Less Bad” Secular Representatives: ... 43
Appointing Sharīʿah Judges in Man-Made Systems: ... 44
Sixth: Important Juristic Alerts ... 44
Seventh: A Comprehensive Conclusion ... 45
Conclusion and Recommendations: ... 45